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Testimony of Rebecca Ingber
Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary
On the Nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court
September 7, 2018
Chairman Grassley, Ranking Member Feinstein, and Members of the Committee: thank you for the
invitation to testify as you consider the nomination of Judge Brett Kavanaugh to the Supreme Court.
I am an associate professor at the Boston University School of Law, where I write and teach about
executive power, international law, and national security, and a Senior Fellow at The Center on Law
and Security at NYU School of Law. Previously, I served for several years in the U.S. government
as an attorney-adviser in the U.S. Department of State Office of the Legal Adviser, where I advised
the State Department and worked with colleagues at the Departments of Justice and Defense, in the
intelligence community, and at the White House, on issues of international law and the President’s
war powers.
I am honored to speak to the committee about these matters as you consider Judge Kavanaugh’s
nomination to the Supreme Court. Judge Kavanaugh has had an exceptional career, and has many
obvious strengths. Nevertheless, I believe there are concerns his jurisprudence raises that should be
addressed before final consideration of his nomination. My testimony will focus on two: First, I will
discuss Judge Kavanaugh’s reluctance to impose checks on the President in the national security
realm, and the harms in undue deference for national security decision-making and government
accountability. Second, I will address Judge Kavanaugh’s unusually dismissive views on the role of
international law in the U.S. domestic system, and in particular, international law’s role in construing
the limits Congress sets on the President’s authority. Taken together, should they be adopted by the
Supreme Court, these approaches could result in a President wielding essentially unfettered power at
the mere invocation of war or national security. Both put him at odds with the judicial philosophy
of Justice Kennedy, whom Judge Kavanaugh has been nominated to replace. The difference in their
judicial approaches is stark and significant, both to the separation of powers and to the United
States’ reputation on the world stage. Should he be confirmed, Judge Kavanaugh may be in a
position for decades to restrict the ability of courts and Congress to check the President, and to
shape how the United States engages with and defines international law.
National Security Deference to the President
I will turn first to Judge Kavanaugh’s approach to deference to the President in the national security
sphere, and the consequences of such deference for the national security decision-making of the
executive branch. I spent several years working in the government on the receiving end of this
deference, as an attorney within the executive branch working on national security matters under
two presidential administrations. During that time, I had a front row seat to how the executive
branch grapples with national security litigation, and my experience from my government service
informs my views on these matters.

Judge Kavanaugh’s opinions reveal that he is exceedingly reluctant to impose checks on the
President in the national security sphere, including by declining to impose congressional limits on
Presidential action. He has referred generally to his approach as deference toward the political
branches—the President and Congress—together, and indeed he has expressed in his scholarship the
view that Congress has a strong constitutional role to play in war powers decisions. But his judicial
opinions suggest that he is not inclined to take a neutral position as between Congress and the
President even in the face of congressional legislation. In fact, Judge Kavanaugh has set an
extremely high bar for finding that Congress has spoken to constrain the President’s war powers or
where the President invokes national security.1 And he has set a low bar for finding that Congress
has empowered the President.2 Furthermore, Judge Kavanaugh has suggested that the President
holds significant Constitutional authority to act unilaterally in wartime, without Congress, and that as
a result, courts must broadly construe any statutory grant of power to the President in this area.3
The result is that—in stark contrast to Justice Kennedy, who regularly authored or joined opinions
upholding limits on the President’s wartime powers—Judge Kavanaugh has almost never found
occasion for constraining the President in the national security space.
It is therefore worth reflecting on what this level of extraordinary deference to the government in
the national security sphere looks like, and the effect it has on government decision-making and on
the rights of the individuals affected by these decisions.
In this section, I will first discuss why judicial review is so important to Presidential accountability
on matters of national security specifically. Second, I will address some of the myths surrounding
national security decision-making and beliefs about the necessity for aggressive deference from the
courts. Third, I will discuss why the particularities of executive branch decision-making in litigation
make it critical that national security adjudication have real teeth, and not just be a rubber stamp on
the positions the government pursues zealously in the context of defensive litigation.
The Importance of Judicial Review of National Security Decisions
The importance of judicial review of the President’s national security decisions comes down to this:
litigation is one of the very few lawful vehicles that provides a check on the President’s power, and
accountability for harms to individuals who typically have no other recourse, ideally divorced from
partisan politics.
1

See, e.g., Rattigan v. Holder, 689 F.3d 764 (2012)(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)(arguing that the court
should not review claims under the Civil Rights Act where the alleged retaliation involved reporting
security concerns); El-Shifa Pharmaceutical Industries Co. v. United States, 607 F.3d 836, 858 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (en banc) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(“courts must be cautious about interpreting an
ambiguous statute to constrain or interfere with the Executive Branch’s conduct of national security
or foreign policy”).
2
See, e.g., Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542 (2013)(finding that the 2001 AUMF grants the President to
detain individuals who—in the words of Judge Edwards’ concurrence—“is not someone who
transgressed the provisions of the AUMF or the NDAA.”) Judge Edwards thus argued that Judge
Kavanaugh’s opinion and the precedents he had joined “stretched the meaning of the AUMF and
the NDAA so far beyond the terms of these statutory authorizations that habeas corpus proceedings
… are functionally useless.” Id.
3
El-Shifa, supra, at 858-59 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(“The Executive plainly possesses a significant
degree of exclusive, preclusive Article II power in both the domestic and national security arenas.”)
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Judicial review of the President’s actions is not some modern contrivance, but is rather a
fundamental component of the separation of powers established by the Framers. It is a necessary
means of checking the President, and it is also a means of addressing individual rights and harms,
particularly when the affected individuals do not have powerful political allies, or when protecting
those individuals does not play well in the political moment. In the national security context, in
particular, the individuals whose rights are at stake often have the least political power to remediate
their harms in any way other than through the courts.
Moreover, judicial review is all the more critical in the national security space because so much of
what the executive branch does in this sphere takes place in secret. But secret or not, these actions
often have a direct impact on real people’s lives. When a judge says that a matter is not for courts to
decide but should instead be left to the accountable branches, we need to then ask, how precisely—
and by whom—is this branch being held accountable? One way we hold these branches
accountable is through public scrutiny. And yet public scrutiny is often impossible when so many of
the government’s actions are taken in secret.
Thus, one of the few tools available for holding the executive branch accountable for actions taken
in the name of national security is lawsuits brought by people who feel they have been harmed by
the government’s policies, which can then be litigated in a non-politicized forum.
This is not to say that we have to attribute bad faith to executive branch actors in order to deem
judicial review important. In my experience there is a great deal of thoughtful decision-making that
happens inside the executive branch national security apparatus. There is often significant, robust
process and debate that accompanies major decisions, and executive actors grapple with legal rules
that they interpret to constrain themselves even in areas where the courts may never tread, and even
when the legal rules or interpretations are those that the executive branch has itself established.
But sometimes, even a robust process can lead to Presidential overreach. After all, the premise of
the separation of powers is that each branch will seek to enhance its own authority, and the other
branches (including the courts) are there to impose limits. And sometimes the process itself is
lacking. Mistakes happen. Bad decisions may come about through incompetence, insufficiency of
facts, exigency, and even, yes, through the intentional abuse of power.
The executive branch, in short, has to be held to account, and it must be held to account by some
source outside itself: by the courts, by Congress, and by civil society. Even for officials acting with
the best intentions, the fire drill of government life at the highest levels means that officials will not
always have or take the opportunity to revisit decisions, even poorly or insufficiently processed
decisions, unless forced to do so by some external trigger. And litigation is one of the few available
triggers for doing so. But litigation is not costless, even for actors seeking to hold the government
accountable, and it can in fact have perverse effects when litigation occurs in a context in which
judges are not inclined to impose real checks on the President. I will discuss below the effect of
litigation on impelling an aggressively defensive posture in executive branch decision-making, which
makes it critical that judicial review have real teeth.
Myths Surrounding Judicial Review of National Security Issues
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Before I turn to that, I will first address the arguments that tend to underlie deference to the
President on matters of national security, and that animate much judicial deference in this realm,
including in Judge Kavanaugh’s own decisions. These arguments focus on institutional competence:
that national security matters are somehow different than other areas, and that the President is best
placed to make expedient, expert decisions on matters that require immediate attention and could
affect the safety of citizens and residents of this country or the use of force abroad.
On this, I think it’s important to pull away the veil of mystery draped over national security law.
First, when national security matters receive a heightened level of deference to the executive, this
incentivizes the President to classify more and more activity as coming within the national security
ambit. “National security” is often an overbroad, malleable term. For example, does addressing the
abuse alleged in the Meshal case, of an American citizen by FBI agents overseas, demand a different
set of rules than other cases of abuse, simply because the government asserts “national security”
concerns?4 Should the President’s claim of national security prerogative change the U.S. citizen’s
rights or remedy? If so, why? Crafting a deference policy that is triggered whenever the President
cites national security or foreign actions is not merely a neutral policy of waiting for the political
branches to weigh in. In practice, it can mean casting aside normal process and established rights in
favor of the executive branch, at the utterance of the magic words “national security” or “war.”
And yet, despite government claims to the contrary, very few—if any—activities for which the
President claims national security deference involve matters where the nation’s security will actually
turn on whether the President’s actions are reviewable in court, or whether remedies are provided
for abuses and overreach.
Second, while some national security actions obviously do require expedience, many do not.
Expedience is an argument that the executive branch often uses to stave off interference from the
courts, but it is not otherwise a common feature of executive branch action. We were told that
battlefield exigencies necessitated holding detainees as combatants without judicial review.
Ultimately, detainees at Guantanamo (many of whom were not in fact captured on a battlefield) did
receive review, some in multiple fora, and the sky did not fall. We were told that military
commissions were necessary to try the 9/11 attackers in order to bring them to justice quickly. A
decade and a half later, we are still waiting for that military commission to get off the ground. And
we are told time and again that the exigencies of war demand that the President have urgent
flexibility in determining the scope of the conflict, and thus do not permit him to return to Congress
to update the now seventeen-year-old use of force statute, each time he intends to bring a new
group into its ambit. ISIS, which we are currently fighting, did not exist at the time that Congress
enacted that 2001 statute, but the President tells us it must come within its scope. The President is
as we speak detaining a U.S. citizen under this theory. We have been fighting ISIS now for over
four years. We have been holding this U.S. citizen for a year. There has been time to review this
decision in court, and there has been time for the President to go to Congress.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, arguments about national security deference focus on the
executive branch’s unique expertise. Here, I think there is a great deal of truth to the argument.
4

Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 429-30 (2015) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)(arguing against the
application of a Bivens remedy to a case where a U.S. citizen alleged abuse in detention by FBI
officers abroad, based on “extraterritoriality and national security,” and because such extension
would render “U.S. officials undoubtedly … more hesitant in investigating and interrogating
suspected al Qaeda members abroad.”)
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The executive branch as a whole—operating as it does the war machinery of the state, intelligence
collection and analysis, diplomacy and foreign policy, not to mention the system of classification
keeping so much of this operation secret—surely holds within it a significant advantage in expertise
over the courts on matters of national security. But this, too, can be overstated. The courts deal
with many complicated and sensitive issues—consider mob trials, or terrorism trials in Article III
courts, which have as yet been quicker and more successful than military commissions—and the
three branches have found ways to accommodate judicial review in these contexts.
Executive Positions in National Security Litigation
Moreover—and this caveat may swallow the government’s expertise-related advantages—this wealth
of national security expertise is not necessarily responsible for any given position the executive
branch takes in court.
What do I mean by this? As I mention above, litigation forces the government to revisit its prior
acts. But once the government is facing a legal challenge, it does not revisit those acts in a vacuum,
in which it seeks the “best view” of the law or policy that it might have taken in advance of the
challenged conduct. Instead, once the executive branch faces a lawsuit, all forces—down to which
officials within the executive branch draft the argument or hold decision-making authority—align to
shape the government’s legal position from a defensive crouch.
What this means in practice is that the government’s legal position in national security litigation will
be aggressively protective of the government’s prior decisions and actions. Defensive litigation over
the President’s national security policies is not an area where the government is inclined to give any
ground. Department of Justice litigators who take the lead in these cases view their role in narrow
terms: their job, as they see it, is to protect executive power and flexibility for the policy-makers, and
refuse to concede an inch, even if the policymakers themselves do not support the underlying
policies or would not take the underlying actions were the decision to come to them anew.
Accordingly, what judges tend to view as the executive’s well-considered legal position is often
instead not the result of an expert-led robust process to come to the “best view” of the law, but
instead simply a zealously-pursued litigation position, heavily shaped by litigators.
Moreover, much as Judge Kavanaugh views deference to the executive as pursuing a limited role for
judges in the national security space, the reality is that the executive branch looks to the courts to
understand the parameters of its authority. Once a court defers to the President in a given case, the
argument that the executive branch had made before the court that the court finds sufficient
becomes baked into the executive branch’s understanding of the law, even if the court only intended
to defer to the executive’s power to define those parameters itself. The court’s deference thus has
the effect of a merits decision, which becomes the law for the executive branch going forward.
When a judge weighing whether the government has met its burden in that regard rules that, for
example, staying at a particular guest house in Afghanistan, at which the government claims certain
members of al Qaeda resided, is “overwhelming” evidence,5 he may intend merely that this is
enough to permit the government to go ahead and make its own unilateral determination about the
individual’s proper status. But the government is likely to read this not as mere deference but as a
status determination itself, and moreover, as an assessment of the necessary facts to make that status
5

Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (2010).
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determination going forward. In other words, there is a tendency in the government to see judicial
ratification of the principle that staying at this guest house or one similarly situated as sufficient to
make someone an enemy combatant. The results of such a status? For many in the executive
branch, that would mean that the President could not only detain such a person—indefinitely, for
now, as there does not seem to be an end in sight to the conflict—but also target and kill him.
What this “limited role” for courts in the national security realm means in practice is that the court
defers to the government’s aggressive litigation position, crafted to maximally protect presidential
power, which then becomes the judicially-ratified law that the government follows going forward. If
the courts never push back—and under Judge Kavanaugh’s preferred approach, but contrary to
Justice Kennedy’s, such pushback would be exceedingly rare—the result will be an ever-ratcheting
up of executive power, both vis-à-vis the other branches and as against individuals.
One might respond to this reality in a few ways. First, one might seek to do away with litigation
entirely and leave the executive branch to decide these matters through internal processes without
judicial intervention. But as I note above, the government does make mistakes that impose genuine
harm on individuals, it makes them in secret, it does not often revisit them, and there are few lawful
processes outside of litigation to check the President. Second, this suggests that Congress itself
needs to act more assertively to create clear checks on the President for the courts to uphold.
(Congress does grant power to the President against a backdrop of constraints, in particular
constraints based in international law, but as I will describe in the second section below, Judge
Kavanaugh has dismissed these as a check on the President.) In any event, litigation shines a
spotlight on government action that almost no other mechanisms can match.
Thus, the third option—which to my view is essential alongside Congressional engagement—is for
judicial review to have real teeth, and for judges to see the government as a litigant in a genuine
adversarial process, where the President has a real prospect of losing.
This is the crux of the matter when considering extremely deferential judicial leanings in this space.
For national security litigation to operate as a real check on the President, it is not enough to simply
bring the parties into court and rubber stamp the executive branch’s litigation position. In fact,
extreme deference to the executive branch is often—for the reasons I discuss above—worse than
no judicial review at all.
International Law as United States Law
Next, and relatedly, I would urge the committee to consider the positions that Judge Kavanaugh has
taken seeking to dismiss or severely limit the role of international law in the U.S. legal system. Judge
Kavanaugh’s position on the limited role for courts in considering international law is highly relevant
to his position on the limited role for courts in checking the President. In wartime, international
law—law that the United States itself played an outsized role in crafting and convincing other
nations to adopt—often provides the most important set of clear rules checking the President’s legal
authority. It has been the longstanding approach of all three branches of government that statutes
must be construed in light of international law—including international law limits on the President’s
wartime conduct—and it is the approach the Supreme Court takes to this day, and which Justice
Kennedy has consistently adopted. If the Court were instead to adopt Judge Kavanaugh’s approach
rejecting such limits, the courts would have little recourse for interpreting the limits of the
President’s power in wartime.
6

This is not an area where Judge Kavanaugh has merely followed precedent with his hands tied.
Rather, he has gone to great lengths to dismiss the role of international law as a legal constraint even
on the President’s war powers, in the face of longstanding precedents to the contrary, and even
where the majority of his colleagues have found his position unnecessary to the merits of the case. I
will focus in particular here on Judge Kavanaugh’s dismissal of the role of international law in
shaping the courts’ and the political branches’ interpretation of statutes generally, and the President’s
war powers specifically.
Under longstanding precedent, even those international law norms that are not judicially enforceable
in the first instance as a rule of decision form the backdrop against which courts must engage with
statutes, and this is all the more true for statutes governing the President’s war powers. For more
than 200 years, under what is known as the Charming Betsy canon of construction, it is a wellestablished rule – as Justice Scalia reiterated in his dissent in Hartford Fire – that in the absence of a
clear statement by Congress to the contrary, the courts will assume that Congress intended for the
United States to comply with its international law obligations, rather than read a statute to violate
international law.6 Judge Kavanaugh has written that he would reject that rule, and would instead
hold that courts have no role in interpreting an ambiguous statute with reference to international law
unless Congress makes a clear statement that they must.7
This position is all the more untenable in the war powers context, where all three branches of
government have looked to international law to define war powers over the entire course of this
nation’s history.8 The concept of “war” itself, and thus the Constitution’s allocation of war powers,
have always been understood against the backdrop of what war and force mean on the international
plane. When Congress authorizes the President to use all “necessary and appropriate” force, it does
so against the backdrop of that history. Indeed, Presidents have consistently interpreted their war
powers in line with international law, and the Supreme Court has ratified this understanding
repeatedly, including in opinions that Justice Kennedy joined.9
Perhaps because these rules have always guided our understanding, international law is one of the
only tools the courts and the political branches have for interpreting war powers.
This means that international law is often the only limiting principle for interpreting the outer
bounds of the President’s wartime authorities.
This is not only a matter of constraint on the President. The use of international law as an
interpretive tool to shape Constitutional or statutory powers can have both constraining and
permissive effects on the President’s powers. The President and the Supreme Court both have long
looked to international law to construe the outer limits of the President’s wartime authority
expansively as well as narrowly, and even to override what would otherwise be the normal operation
of other domestic constitutional or statutory protections. For example, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case
involving a U.S. citizen detained by the U.S. government on U.S. soil, the government argued that
6

Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C. J.); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
7
Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
8
See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814); Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635
(1863).
9
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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the President’s wartime detention authority derived from both the U.S. constitution and statute, and
was non-reviewable.10 The Supreme Court disagreed with that overly aggressive position, but
nevertheless found that the President’s authority to use force under a congressional statute—the
2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, which did not mention detention—implicitly
granted the President authority to detain U.S. citizens. The Court read this implicit authority to
detain into the statute even though a prior statute—the Non-Detention Act of 1971—prohibited
detention of citizens without a clear act of Congress, and even though the Constitution calls for
specific processes to be followed before the government may restrict an individual’s liberty. The
Court nevertheless held, in a plurality opinion joined by Justice Kennedy, that the 2001 AUMF
authorized detention by looking to the international laws of war, which both recognizes detention as
incident to war and which imposes constraints on that power to detain. Justice Kennedy joined the Hamdi
Court in incorporating these international law constraints—such as that detention may last only until
the end of hostilities—into what the statute means when it authorizes “appropriate” uses of force.
When the President uses force in wartime, he or she is acting outside the normal operation of
domestic law in numerous ways. But once the courts accept that the law is different in war or
“armed conflict,” and that the President has a prominent role in discerning the line between war and
not-war, it is critical to identify limiting principles on what the President can do.
One of the only limiting principles that the executive branch itself has advanced time and again, as a
means of reassuring both the courts and Congress that his authority in this realm is not entirely
unfettered, is compliance with the international laws of war. These rules do not hamper the
President’s ability to fight a war, but rather prohibit conduct that centuries of experience dictates
falls outside of what humanity will tolerate. And they are not rules imposed by some outside source.
They are instead rules states have agreed to be bound by, specifically in wartime. Rules prohibiting
torture. Rules prohibiting the detention of individuals after hostilities have ended. Rules prohibiting
the intentional targeting of civilians. And the United States in particular has always played an
outsized role in shaping these rules. We do not agree and have not agreed to rules for war that do
not serve our interests, and that we do not intend to follow.
Judge Kavanaugh would have courts ignore these rules in interpreting the President’s wartime
statutory (and constitutional) authority. He views them as merely precatory—important for the
President to follow, perhaps, as a matter of good policy, but not commitments with the force of
judicially enforceable law. What is more, he would have the courts ignore these rules even in
considering the otherwise open-ended “necessary and appropriate force” Congress generally
authorizes the President to use in war. The result, should the Supreme Court adopt Judge
Kavanaugh’s approach, would be virtually no limiting principles on what the President can do in
war, at least as far as the courts are concerned.
Yet it is the province of the courts to say what the law is. The question is not whether international
law is binding law on the United States, which it unarguably is and will always be. The question is
whether the U.S. Supreme Court will continue to play a role in interpreting that international law
and the President’s war powers against the backdrop of those rules, as it always has. Judge
Kavanaugh’s opinions suggest that the United States need not honor these commitments as law, and
that Congress does not presumptively intend to ensure U.S. compliance with such law, but that they
are merely political promises that can be ignored as political realities demand.
10

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 US 507 (2004).
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It is essential, especially today, that the United States present a strong message to the world: we
honor our legal commitments. The Supreme Court is a key player in this arena, and Judge
Kavanaugh’s opinions on international law going forward will have real salience on the world stage.
Despite the Judge’s limited view of the judicial role in this sphere, the reality is that all three
branches have a role to play in matters of international law. The Supreme Court is frequently taken
to speak for the United States when it issues pronouncements on international law, which are then
understood as the U.S. position by international tribunals and foreign courts looking for evidence of
opinio juris. And the Supreme Court’s opinions on the domestic status of our international
obligations have a significant effect on the extent to which the United States is able to honor those
commitments. For all of these reasons, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on the role of
international law in the U.S. domestic system have real effects internationally, and may cause states
to question the extent to which the United States is able to keep its promises. Should he be
confirmed, Judge Kavanaugh’s positions on international law will have a world audience. I would
therefore urge the committee to consider and to impress upon Judge Kavanaugh the importance of
upholding the Charming Betsy canon and the well-established role of international law in interpreting
war powers as longstanding precedent against which this body legislates, as well as the rhetorical
importance of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in demonstrating to the world the United States’
commitment to the rule of law.
Conclusion
This is a dangerous time for the separation of powers. Many are looking to the courts as the last
bulwark against a President who often shows a casual disregard for the rule of law and the
longstanding norms that represent good government. This Committee should ask Judge Kavanaugh
to make clear that, should he be confirmed, he will hold the President accountable for his national
security decisions that violate the Constitution or statutory constraints. Congress, too, should
assertively legislate clear constraints in this arena. Judge Kavanaugh has in his scholarship exhibited
support for some role for Congress in national security, as long as congressional statutes are loud
and clear. We also know that he sees constitutional limits to Congress’s ability to constrain the
President in this space, and we do not know where he would draw that line, although his
jurisprudence suggests it will favor the President.11 I would urge that the Committee seek to assure
itself in this regard that Judge Kavanaugh would support congressional checks on Presidential power
should he be confirmed to the Supreme Court. And then I would urge you to consider legislative
means for checking the President where the courts, under Judge Kavanaugh’s approach, may
otherwise step aside.

11

El-Shifa, supra, at 858 (“if a statute were passed that clearly limited the kind of Executive national
security or foreign policy activities at issue in these cases, such a statute as applied might well violate
Article II”).
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